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II. The Basic Problem
To see the basic problem, consider this hypothetical case:
A woman was admitted to an obstetric service in the early stages of labor at 28 weeks gestation. At the time of her admission, her fetus was estimated to weigh two pounds. The likelihood that a baby born at that gestation would develop respiratory distress syndrome of prematurity (RDS) after birth was approximately 40%. There had been reports in the medical literature for more than three decades that administration of antenatal cortico-steroids (ACS) would significantly reduce the incidence of RDS after birth to approximately 28%. 1 However, concerns about possible side-effects of ACS also existed. Some obstetricians routinely gave ACS to women threatening premature delivery; others did not. This woman did not receive ACS.
The woman delivered her baby at 28 weeks gestation. The baby weighed two pounds. The baby was sick with RDS and died. The obstetrician was sued for malpractice. The plaintiff claimed that the obstetrician violated the standard of care by not providing ACS, and that the failure to provide ACS caused or contributed to the child's death.
Two kinds of expert witnesses were called by the plaintiff and defense lawyers:
obstetricians discussing the standard of care and neonatologists discussing causation. We focus here on the latter question. 2 How should the legal system resolve the causation problem, which typically requires the plaintiff to establish that it was more probable than not that the failure to administer ACS "caused" RDS in this infant? To approach this problem, is it important to separate two different questions. could not. In short, for any individual baby the probability of attributing RDS to a lack of ACS (the relative risk reduction) is 12/40 = 30%. That number falls far short of 50.1% probability, which is required by the "more probable than not" standard.
The confusion, in short, is between a statistically significant absolute risk reduction across large groups and a relative risk reduction for individuals. This confusion arises in many tort cases. In some cases, of course, causation can be shown in both senses. Consider an example, quite familiar to pediatricians, and arguably the greatest medical advance in the last half-century-vaccinations. Since the mid-1950s, polio, diphtheria, whooping cough, mumps, measles, German measles, pneumococcal pneumonia, and Hemophilus meningitis have all virtually disappeared as public health concerns in the United States-because giving vaccines to children immunizes them against acquiring these diseases. Imagine a medical practitioner who chose not to give his patients vaccines (analogous to our test case of an obstetrician who chose not give ACS).
And imagine further that one of his patients caught one of these preventable diseases, and years old in the U.S.). After H. flu vaccine was introduced, the rate was reduced by almost a factor of 100 to approximately 1/100,000 children, or 300 cases per year. 3 The math is quite straightforward. Consider a hypothetical group of 100,000 children under the age of four years, all of whom did not get the vaccine. One hundred of these children would be expected to get meningitis (1/1,000 * 100,000). Now consider a group of 100,000 children of the same age who did get the vaccine-only one of them would still have gotten meningitis (that is the size of the absolute risk reduction, from 100/100,000 to 1/100,000). Therefore, 99 of every 100 of unvaccinated children who acquired meningitis could attribute their meningitis to non-vaccination (the relative risk reduction is 99%). That is much more probably true than not. Hence causation, in the legally relevant sense, has been established.
III. Toxic Exposures and Related Problems
The same analysis applies in the inverse situation-that is, the risk of toxic exposure, whether to an environmental toxin, or a drug. Such situations also arise in the tort system with some frequency. In these cases, we must consider the arithmetic involved in the risk of exposure vs. benefit of non-exposure (as opposed to our previous example, where we balanced the potential benefit of exposure to the risk of nonexposure). It turns out that these situations are analytically identical. In the context of medical malpractice, consider, as an example familiar to pediatricians (or at least older pediatricians), the potential relationship between exposure to the antibiotic chloramphenicol and the development of a complication, aplastic anemia-a potentially fatal disease where the bone marrow stops producing red blood cells.
Imagine that a pediatrician prescribed chloramphenicol to a child with a serious infection. The child recovered from the infection, but developed aplastic anemia, and sued, claiming that the aplastic anemia was caused, more probably than not, by chloramphenicol. How would we know?
First, is there any causal relationship between chloramphenicol and aplastic anemia? The actual data for chloramphenicol exposure and aplastic anemia go something like this. The incidence of aplastic anemia in the general pediatric population is roughly one in a million. 4 The incidence of aplastic anemia in children after chloramphenicol exposure is roughly one in ten thousand. 5 If the populations studied are large enough, these two frequencies can be shown to be statistically significantly different using straightforward statistical methods. Within large populations, there is, without question, an increase in the absolute risk of aplastic anemia after chloramphenicol exposure.
Next, consider a hypothetical individual child with aplastic anemia who had been exposed to chloramphenicol. Was the chloramphenicol more likely than not to have caused this particular child's aplastic anemia? In order to move from a statistically significant increase in aplastic anemia for the general population to more probable than not for an individual case, we need to assess not just the absolute risk increase, but also the relative risk increase in that case--i.e., how large is the chloramphenicol effect, compared to the background incidence of aplastic anemia.
That calculation goes like this. We begin by assessing the incidence of aplastic anemia in a group of children who were exposed to chloramphenicol. Next, we compare this incidence to the incidence of aplastic anemia in a group of children who did not receive chloramphenicol, controlling for potential confounders. Suppose a million children were treated with chloramphenicol-we would expect to see 100 cases of aplastic anemia due to chloramphenicol (1,000,0000 children exposed * 1 case/10,000 children exposed). There would also be one child who would have gotten aplastic anemia without chloramphenicol (1,000,000 children * 1 case/1,0000,000 children unexposed).
The likelihood then for any individual child that the aplastic anemia was due to chloramphenicol exposure would be 100/101 = 99%-much more probably true than not.
IV. Omission, Commission, Contribution, and Cause
Intuitively, the analysis of commission is different from the analysis of omission.
The former seems straightforward-if a doctor cuts a blood vessel and it bleeds, then she caused the bleeding. If she gave a medicine and the patient had an allergic reaction, then she caused the reaction. This type of direct causation seems unambiguous. "cause"-what is sometimes called the "background rate." For many errors of commission (like bleeding after cutting an artery), the background rate (spontaneous bleeding of the artery) is virtually zero. Consequently, the frequency of arterial bleeding in the exposed groups (those who were operated on) is nearly identical to the frequency in overall population, and the relative risk of bleeding after exposure is ~100%-if you had arterial bleeding after an operation, it almost certainly came from the surgery.
However, there are other examples of commission where the background rate is far from zero. Consider the administration of VIOXX, an anti-inflammatory agent that has been associated with increased risk of heart attacks in adults. At a minimum, we can be sure that the background rate of heart attacks in some populations of non-VIOXX exposed adults is much higher than the rate of spontaneous arterial bleeding in people without surgery.
Similarly, for many errors of omission (like failure to give ACS in premature infants) the frequency of injury (RDS), even in the treated population, is far from zero (it is 28% in our example, compared to 40% in untreated infants). ACS certainly reduces the risk of RDS in absolute terms within large populations, but the relative risk reduction for particular infants is only (40% -28%)/40% = 30%. Consequently, claims that, to a 51% degree of certainty (more probably true than not), failure to provide ACS "caused" RDS in an individual baby are difficult to support. Once again, counter-examples exist. The incidence of Hemophilus meningitis after Hemophilus vaccine is close to zero, and consequently the relative risk reduction of Hemophilus vaccine approaches 100%.
These statistical distinctions find resonance in the lay terms "caused" and "contributed." When the background rate of injury is very small (e.g., the miniscule rate of spontaneous arterial bleeding) then there is nothing "contributed" by other causes, and the entire observed rate of injury is "caused" by the intervention. But for a phenomenon where the frequency of injury is still substantial despite medical intervention (like RDS after ACS), the relative contribution of the behavior in question falls as the contribution of other causes rises. In all cases, omissions and commissions are amenable to the same statistical analysis.
V. On System Design and Individual Causation
The analysis thus far demonstrates that plaintiffs may not be able to show causation, in the relevant sense, even though the general behavior in question produced a significant increase in the statistical risk across large populations. From the systemic perspective, there is a large issue in the background. Suppose that the legal system is concerned with general deterrence-that it seeks to produce optimal behavior on the part of actors (doctors in the contexts on which we have focused here). If prospective actors are attentive to the signals given by the legal system, behavior might well be altered, to the appropriate degree, even though causation in the relevant legal sense cannot be shown in individual cases-if and because such behavior increases the general welfare of the population.
Recall the ACS case with which we began. It is clear that from the standpoint of system design, doctors should be giving ACS to pregnant women in the relevant circumstances. Even if plaintiffs cannot prove causation in individual cases (because the injury is not more probably than not a product of the defendant's action), there is no doubt that across large populations, the failure to administer ACS creates a statistically significant increase in risk of morbidity for prematurely born infants. A sensible administrative agency would want doctors to give ACS to pregnant women in these situations. Perhaps courts, concerned with giving the right deterrent signal, should do the same thing.
From the standpoint of optimal deterrence, it might therefore be possible to defend a decision to relax the standard causation requirements in the interest of promoting socially desirable behavior. But there are two problems with any such defense.
The first is that the tort system is often understood in terms of corrective justice, and the "more likely than not" standard seems to depend on judgments about what corrective justice requires. But administrative agencies are not fundamentally concerned with corrective justice, and it would be possible to argue that courts, alert to the problems we have discussed, should shift from corrective justice to optimal deterrence as well.
The second problem with a relaxed causation standard, involving risk-risk tradeoffs, is more complicated. Imagine an intervention (say, caesarian section as opposed to vaginal delivery at 24 weeks gestation) in which the evidence showed that the risk of bleeding in the baby's brain was reduced by 3% using C/Section-but simultaneously the overall the risks of post-operative complications (bleeding, infection, clots) for the mother were increased by 30% after C/Section compared to vaginal delivery. And now imagine that a baby is born vaginally (because the obstetrician balanced those two risks and decided against the caesarian operation), and further imagine that the baby developed bleeding in the brain (but, of course, the mother did not develop any of the complications of the C/section that she did not have). How are courts or administrative agencies supposed to balance those comparisons? It is clear that as the relative risk reduction of any intervention approaches 1.0 (no beneficial impact at all), the countervailing concerns about side-effects are likely to become more important.
The problem of risk-risk tradeoffs suggests that a defendant should not be found liable in cases in which the act in question reduced risks on balance-even if an adverse side-effect came to fruition. Of course this is a claim about the standard of care, not about causation. In easy cases, behavior that produced a small, population-wide increase in one risk should not be found negligent if the increase was necessary to produce a larger, population-wide decrease in another risk. Our claim, then, is that even if it is possible to defend a relaxed conception of causation in the circumstances we are discussing, any such relaxation must take place in a context in which courts pay attention to the full set of risks, and do not impose liability when doctors (or other defendants) reduced risks on balance.
Conclusion
To establish causation in tort cases, plaintiffs must show that it is more probable than not that the behavior in question caused their injury. A significant absolute risk reduction across a large population does not necessarily establish causation in a tort case.
This point holds for both acts and omissions, and it extends across a wide array of actual and imaginable problems. In malpractice cases in particular, what is necessary is an assessment of the risk reduction to the particular plaintiff, not across a large population.
A statistically significant decrease in population-wide risk is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the tortuous behavior was not likely to have caused injury in any individual plaintiff.
For the most part, our analysis has focused on application of standard principles of causation. We have also suggested, however, that if optimal deterrence is the goal, use of the standard principles may be misconceived in cases in which an intervention may produce a significant decrease in risks across large populations. But if courts are tempted to relax standard causation requirements on the grounds that we have sketched, they should do so knowingly and explicitly, and with careful attention to the possibility of risk-risk tradeoffs.
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